

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-11

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

AECE-00 DRC-01 /165 W

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P R 241956Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1361

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 0665

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY SESSION JANUARY 24, 1974

BEGIN SUMMARY. MBFR PLENARY MEETING TOOK PLACE ON 24 JANUARY 1974 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF GDR REP AMBASSADOR OESER AND HEARD STATEMENTS FROM US REP (SEPTTEL VIENNA 0605) AND OESER. EAST GERMAN STATEMENT WAS MORE MODERATE AND LESS POLEMICAL IN TONE THAN PAST STATEMENTS AND COVERED FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS: READINESS OF EAST GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO PARTICIPATE IN CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, THE PROPOSAL OF A FIFTEEN PERCENT REDUCTION THAT WILL INCLUDE ALL NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT INCLUDE GROND, AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, CONFIDENTIAL

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WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IN-

CLUSION OF AIR FORCES IN ANY FUTURE AGREEMENT. THE STATEMENT CONCLUDED WITH THE THOUGHT THAT VERY LITTLE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS LONG AS THE WESTERN REPS ADHERED TO THEIR PRESENT PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT

1. THE DELEGATION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC RETURNED TO VIENNA AT THE BEGINNING OF 1974, WITH THE CONVICTION THAT THE WORK WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY US DURING THE FALL OF THE PRECEDING YEAR HAD PROVIDED THE PREDISPOSITION, FOR US NOW TO PROCEED ON A TRULY MUTUAL BASIS TO A DISCUSSION OF PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN TO ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS OUR DESIRE FOR MUTUALLY CONFIDENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

2. OUR DELEGATION HAS THE THANKFUL TASK, TO REPRESENT, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER STATES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY, THE CONCERTED PEACE POLICY OF OUR COUNTRY IN VIENNA. THIS IS A POLICY WHICH IS ALWAYS DOWN-TO-EARTH AND REALISTIC, WHICH PROCEEDED FROM REALITIES, AND IS AND WAS DIRECTED TOWARD AGREEMENTS IN THE SPIRIT OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AMONG GOVERNMENTS OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL ORDERS. IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT WE ARE NOT MAKING UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS FOR THE OTHER SIDE HERE IN VIENNA, BUT RATHER PROCEED STRICTLY FROM THE CONCEPTS OF MUTUAL RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE ONCE MORE THAT THE DESIGN OF THE PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS JOINTLY TABLED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND, CORRESPONDS WITH THIS POINT OF VIEW, AND IS NOT DIRECTED TOWARDS UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES. THE DELEGATION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC REPRESENTS THE INTEREST OF ITS GOVERNMENT AND OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY IN FURTHER STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, IN GUAR-

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ANTIEEING THE INVIOABILITY OF ITS BORDERS, AND NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT CANNOT ACCEPT PROPOSALS WHICH BASICALLY IMPAIR THE SECURITY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND OF ITS ALLIES.

3. WE HAVE ALREADY NOTED HERE THAT IF THE REAL SITUATION IS ACCEPTED BY ALL SIDES, PRACTICAL RESULTS HAVE AND WILL BE REACHED CONCERNING COMPLICATED

QUESTIONS. WE CONSIDER THE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN REACHED OF THE MOST VARIED TYPES IN RECENT YEARS ON SUCH A BASIS AS AN ENCOURAGEMENT FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. WE HAVE IN MIND HERE THOSE AGREEMENTS WHICH SERVED THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS AND CLEARLY EMANATED FROM THE BASIS OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, AS WELL AS THOSE WHICH SERVED TO REGULATE UNRESOLVED RELATIONS FOR DECADES ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

4. ON THE BASIS OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE EXISTING REALITIES AND THE SPIRIT OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE, WE HAVE TO USE THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AS THE FOUNDATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AS WELL. WE CONCUR IN THIS DECISIVE POINT OF DEPARTURE WITH REALISTIC CONCEPTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE EXISTING BALANCE AND WITH SIMILAR IDEAS, WHICH WERE EXPRESSED IN WESTERN NATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. NOBODY CAN DENY THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IS NOT ONLY STABLE, BUT ALSO HAS BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG EUROPEAN STATES OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL ORDERS DURING A LONG POST-WAR PERIOD. DURING RECENT YEARS, PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE WERE STRENGTHENED. THIS WAS ALSO THE RESULT ACHIEVED DURING THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS, IN THE

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SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

AECE-00 DRC-01 /165 W

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P R 241956Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1362

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

FIST HALF OF 1973.

5. IF WE HAVE IN MIND TO SUPPORT THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL
DETENTE WITH PRACTICAL RESULTS IN VIENNA, ONE MUST START HERE
AS WELL AS EVERYWHERE ELSE WITH RESPECT FOR NEGOTIATED
AGREEMENTS, BECAUSE ONLY THAT MAKES TRUSTFUL COOPERATION POSSIBLE.
THE DELEGATION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC THEREFORE STRESSES
TODAY, JUST AS IT DID ON THE OPENING DAY OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS,
THAT IT STRICTLY ADHERES TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PROTOCOL
OF MAY 14, AND TO THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973. THAT IS WHERE
THE PRINCIPLES ARE INSCRIBED, WHICH IN THE OPINION OF ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES MUST FORM THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT:
- THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTION, FROM WHICH DERIVES
THAT EVENTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAENTS CANNOT
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BE UNILATERALLY ADVATAGEOUS TO ONE SIDE, AND THAT EQUALITY
OF REDUCTION MUST BE SAFEGUARDED FOR BOTH SIDES. THEREFORE,
ALL THOSE DESIGNATED AS DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS
MUST THEREFORE FROM THE VERY START CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY
THROUGH REDUCTIONS OF THEIR OWN ARMED FORCES IN THE AGREED
AREA OF REDUCTIONS TOWARDS THE REALIZATION OF THIS BASIC
PRINCIPLE. THIS DISTINGUISHES THEM FROM PARTICIPANTS WITH
SPECIAL STATUS.

- THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, FROM WHICH
DERIVES THE FACT THAT THE SECURITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS DURING
THE COURSE AND AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE REDUCTIONS, MUST
NOT BE LESS, THAN IT WAS BEFORE. THIS PRINCIPLE IS DOUBTLESSLY
CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRST-NAMED PRINCIPLE.

- THE AGREEMENT, TO TAKE PROPER ACCOUNT OF THE COMPLEXITY
OF THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS BY AN EFFECTIVE AND THOROUGH
APPROACH. IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PRINCIPLES, AND
IMMEDIATELY REQUIRES FROM ALL SIDES A COMPLEX GRASP OF THE
PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
IN CENTRAL EUROPE; THAT IS, THE INCLUSION OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN
ARMED FORCES OF ALL DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES, AND THAT
MEANS THEIR GROUND AND AIR FORCES, INCLUSIVELY UNITS WITH
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY FROM THE VERY BEGINNING AND IN EACH PHASE

OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

6. ONE CAN AT ANY TIME TAKE A LOOK TO SEE THAT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST STATES CLEARLY AND FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THESE AGREED PRINCIPLES, WHICH WE HAVE ONLY SKETCHED OUT HERE. UNFORTUNATELY, UP TO NOW, THIS CANNOT BE SAID ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF OUR WESTERN NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. WE DRAW THE CONCLUSION FOR THIS AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF THE DECLARATION OF THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE, ON JANUARY 17, WHO CONTINUES TO HOLD FAST TO THE POSITION WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE WESTERN SIDE DURING THE PAST YEAR, IN SPITE OF THE BASIC CRITICISM BY THE SOCIALIST STATES, AND WHICH NEITHER TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSTRUCTIVE THOUGHTS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES, NOR CHANGES THE WESTERN PROPOSALS AIMED AT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR NATO. THIS IS CHARACTERIZED FOR US BY THE FACT THAT THE HEAD OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION UNDERLINES THE DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION PRACTICALLY SHOULD UNDERTAKE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, WHICH ARE IN NO MANNER MATCHED BY THE WEST BY EQUAL REDUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, AS WE HAVE PROVEN ALREADY

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LAST YEAR, THE EXTENT OF THE REDUCTIONS, TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES; INCLUDING THE BUNDESWEHR OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE, REMAIN NEBULOUS. WHY DOES THE WESTERN PROPOSAL NOT ACCEPT A 15 PERCENT REDUCTION FOR ALL POTENTIAL PARTNERS IN AN AGREEMENT? WE ARE PARTICULARLY PERPLEXED AS TO WHY A REDUCTION OF THE BUNDESWEHR SHOULD NOT COMMENCE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, SINCE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED THEIR INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTION.

7. THE QUESTION SUGGESTS ITSELF, WHY, CONTRARY TO THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT ON THE WESTERN SIDE SEVEN STATES WILL BE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION MEASURES, SIX AMONG THEM ARE NOW NOT READY TO CONTRIBUTE THEIR SHARE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

8. THE ONE-SIDED WESTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDES, THAT SOVIET ARMED FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WITHOUT AN EQUITABLE RECIPROCAL CONTRIBUTION ON THE PART OF THE WEST. IT IS THEREFORE THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF OUR DELEGATION, TO POINT OUT THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND OF ALL PARTICIPATING SOCIALIST STATES, WHICH IS JOINTLY GUARANTEED BY THE ALLIES FORCES AND AMONG THEM PARTICULARLY THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN VIEW OF OBVIOUS FACTS, THE DECLARATIONS OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, THAT THEIR ONE-SIDED PROPOSALS AIM AT A JUST RESULT AND ARE NOT INTENDED TO DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, CREATES ONLY BEWILDERMENT.

9. WE OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLE, THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE SO IMPORTANT FOR PEACE AND SECURITY WILL BE CONDUCTED SERIOUSLY, CAREFULLY AND UNHESITATINGLY. THE ONLY POSSIBILITY TO DO THIS IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER CONSISTS OF STARTING FROM THE ABOVE-NAMED PRINCIPLES, PAYING ATTENTION FROM THE VERY START TO THE COMPLEXITY

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NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

AECE-00 DRC-01 /165 W

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P R 241956Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1363

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

OF THE PROBLEM. THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973 PROVIDES IN THIS SPIRIT FOR THE "MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS", AND NOT FOR A LIMITATION TO GROUND FORCES ONLY. HOWEVER, NOW AS BEFORE, WE ARE BEING PRESENTED WITH ISOLATED PROJECTS, SUCH AS THE ONE OF THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES ONLY. THE NONINCLUSION OF AIR FORCES AND UNITS WHICH ARE EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WITH NUCLEAR COMBAT WEAPONS IS AN OPEN CONTRADICTION TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE AGREED

DOCUMENT. THE ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN SIDE IN SUPPORT OF THIS APPROACH BYPASS THIS FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION, HOW FAR CAN THE GREATER MOBILITY OF THE AIR FORCES, AS COMPARED TO GROUND FORCES, BE A BASIS FOR THEIR NONINCLUSION? AIR FORCE MOBILITY INCREASES THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACKS, LEADING DEEP INTO A COUNTRY, AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS AS WELL
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AS AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND THIS EVEN MORE SO, BECAUSE A LARGE PART OF NATO FIGHTER AIRCRAFT CAN BE USED IN THE CAPACITY OF NUCLEAR ARMS CARRIERS. THIS UNDERLINES THE NECESSITY FOR INCLUDING AIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. ADDITIONALLY, THE REDUCTION OF THE AIR FORCES WOULD TAKE PLACE IN FORM OF ENTIRE TROOP COMPONENTS AND UNITS, AND WOULD INCLUDE FLIGHT CREWS AS WELL AS GROUND PERSONNEL AND THE RESPECTIVE EQUIPMENT. SUCH A REDUCTION AND ALSO A RETURN OF SUCH UNITS CONTRARY TO THE AGREEMENT, CAN EASILY BE ASCERTAINED TODAY BY EACH SIDE WITH PRESENTLY EXISTING TECHNICAL FACILITIES.

10. THE REFUSAL FO THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, TO REDUCE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR UNITS, IS THEREFORE NOT BASED ON OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES, BUT MERELY REFLECTS THE INTENTION TO OBTAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGES VIS-A-VIS THE SOCIALIST STATES. SUCH AN APPROACH, THEREFORE, DOES NOT SIMPLIFY THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND DOES NOT LEAD TO QUICK RESULTS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. ONE-SIDED PROPOSALS WHICH ARE DIRECTED TOWARDS AN ADVANTAGE FOR NATO AND THE DIMINISHMENT OF SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, ARE ONLY SUITABLE TO DELAY AND MAKE OUR NEGOTIATIONS MORE DIFFICULT.

11. WE WOULD WELCOME IT IF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATO STATES WOULD VIEW THE CRITICAL REMARKS WHICH ARE DIRECTED AGAINST THEIR BASIC APPROACH OF THE NEGOTIATING SUBJECT AS AN EXPRESSION OF OUR DESIRE TO REACH A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. AS LONG AS THE WESTERN SIDE DOES NOT CHANGE ITS UNREALISTIC POINT OF DEPARTURE ON THE MAIN QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, IT MAKES NO SENSE TO DUSCUSS ASSOCIATED QUESTIONS, AND DIFFICULT TO MAKE OUR WORK MORE FRUITFUL
AND CONCRETE.

POSSIBILITIES OF APPROACHMENT CAN BE REACHED ON A REALISTIC BASIS. WE REPRESENT THE POINTOF VIEW, THAT OUR CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN A FACTUAL AND TRUSTFUL ATMOSPHERE, IN WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES CAN START FROM THE ASSUMPTION, THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. END TEXT. HUMES

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 JAN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA00665
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740117/aaaaapui.tel
Line Count: 381
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <12 APR 2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY SESSION JANUARY 24, 1974 BEGIN SUMMARY. MBFR PLENARY MEETING TOOK PLACE ON
TAGS: PARM, XG, NATO, WARSAW PACT, MBFR
To: STATE SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005